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Quoting Dagmar Herzog’s ‘The “Euthanasia” Murders Archive: Confronting the New Findings’ in Beyond “Ordinary Men”: Christopher R. Browning and Holocaust Historiography, pages 221, 224–225:

[D]ue to unrest in the populace and in particular religiously informed protest — especially the prominent Roman Catholic bishop Clemens August von Galen’s sermon of August 1941 decrying the killings — Hitler had ordered the T4 program officially stopped. But 121 men who had gotten their training and practice in murder in the T4 facilities, along with their now field-tested equipment of carbon monoxide gas chambers, soon were moved on to Poland to turn their attention to the slaughter of European Jews in the Operation Reinhardt death camps of Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. In personnel, in technology, and in attitudes toward lives “unworthy of living,” then, the two mass murder operations were demonstrably interlinked — or, as historian and Auschwitz survivor Henry Friedlander later would put it, “intradependent.”⁵

[…]

One of the most stunning and informative of the recent crop of books on the [Fascist] era is Sara Berger’s Experten der Vernichtung: Das T4-Reinhardt-Netzwerk in den Lagern Belzec, Sobibor und Treblinka (2013).

In addition to mining all the relevant scholarship, Berger combines a fresh look at intra-régime correspondence, deportation lists, and personnel files from the 1940s with close readings of postwar investigative and trial documents, on the one hand, and survivor interviews and memoirs, on the other, to provide a comprehensive analysis of what she rightly notes was the long-neglected “interface” (Schnittstelle) between the T4 murders of the disabled and psychiatric patients and the Operation Reinhardt killings of Polish Jews.

Two elements of her findings are particularly noteworthy: one involves her detailed specification of the pertinence of the precursor background in “euthanasia”; the other entails her deliberate use of the sociological concept of “network analysis” in order to engage from an innovative vantage the longstanding debates among scholars over perpetrator motivation.

Perhaps most affecting and revelatory for present-day readers is Berger’s emphasis on the disproportionate number of former disability caregivers among the killers. Almost a quarter (23 percent) — 27 of the 121 men who worked in both killing operations — had been male nurses (Pfleger).¹⁴ (Also another recent analysis of three of the T4 centres finds that 36 percent of the perpetrators had been caregivers there or at other institutions; caregivers were useful not least because of their comfort and experience in interacting with the population who were to be killed.)¹⁵

Berger, drawing also on earlier findings about Hadamar, explains that being a custodian in a nursing home, psychiatric asylum, or institution for the epileptic or cognitively disabled was, at that historical time, one of the lowest of low-status jobs a working-class man could have. Many of the future lords of life and death who later enjoyed such extraordinary sovereignty, latitude, and impunity had actually failed, sometimes repeatedly, to hold onto employment as mechanics or craftsmen of one kind or another, and — originally coming, as many of them did, from smaller towns and villages — had experienced significant financial instability and insecurity during the economic depression.

Asylum nursing meant a steady paypacket, although the hours were long, the conditions bad, and the pay meagre. Strikingly, moreover, as Berger observes, the care personnel were “generally expected to have a contemptuous, Social Darwinist attitude towards the patients” and, in the institutions in which they worked, already before the ascent of the [Third Reich], “the psychiatrically ill were seen as inferior and economic cost-benefit thinking dominated.”

Further, as Berger stresses, the background in T4 was unquestionably — as she quotes the words of a contemporary — “training-grounds for Poland” (die Vorschule für Polen). Or, in the terms expressed by Erich Bauer, who worked as a driver both for T4 and in Sobibor, “They [his co-workers in Operation Reinhardt] were used to it, of course, from the euthanasia… That was after all the same thing, just on a smaller scale… One could say, bumping people off was already their profession [das Umbringen war schon ihr Beruf].”

The authorities in Berlin could count on the voluntarism of their employees and the fact that there would be few refusals to participate once the staff moved to “the East.” Moreover, not just the use of carbon monoxide and the acquired comfort with killing were relevant aspects of their prior experience. Also the steps in the work/murder process (arrival, address, disrobement, murder) were similar and well-rehearsed — as, too, were the killing principles to be used (deception, speed, and obstruction of possibilities for escape).¹⁶

(Emphasis added. Click here if you have time for more.)

Pgs. 225–226:

The most challenging new research findings, however, involve the selection criteria used by the 42 physicians employed by the central T4 administration as expert evaluators in the first phase of killings of institutionalized patients. These were the individuals (in teams of three, plus one chief expert whose judgment could trump the others) who were to decide, based not on in-person assessments of patients but rather on the cursory scanning of “registration forms” (Meldebögen) filled out by physicians or other staff from patients’ home institutions, whether a particular patient should receive a red plus sign (for death) or a blue minus (for survival).

Sources long thought lost were found after the [short twentieth century]: approximately 30,000 patient files, representing a significant portion of the more than 70,000 individuals killed by carbon monoxide in the six main extermination centres from January 1940 until August 1941. Starting at the end of the 1990s, a multidisciplinary research project worked with these materials using both quantitative and qualitative methods, including also comparisons with more than 500 patient files of individuals who had survived the [Fascist bourgeoisie’s] “euthanasia” program, and looking especially closely at circa 3000 of the 30,000 files.

And while the files were analysed using 90 different variables, one of the major research questions the team posed for itself involved the extent to which “racial hygiene” and “hereditary” factors, social marginalization, medical diagnosis and assessment of “curability,” behaviour within the institution, and/or “capacity for work” (Arbeitsfähigkeit) — and hence economic functionality — determined whether an individual was killed or saved.

See also: ‘The Holocaust, medicine and becoming a physician: the crucial role of education’