The blast radius is narrower than the technique suggests however. There is no remote component, so the attacker must be physically at the keyboard and know the right combination of keys. The machine must also have at least one account linked to an online Microsoft account, because the reset flow that anchors the attack depends on it.

Devices running only local accounts are not affected.

  • semi [he/him]@lemmy.ml
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    2
    ·
    24 minutes ago

    As I don’t really understand the Windows and BitLocker architecture, could someone please clear my confusion? I thought that BitLocker was a full disk encryption feature with the decryption keys derived from the BitLocker password, or a potential cloud-based recovery that would require re-authentication with Microsoft. How could such a encryption be bypassed by just escaping the recovery flow?

  • Adniem@lemmy.today
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    4
    arrow-down
    2
    ·
    1 hour ago

    windows is not trying to be an operating system anymore

    it sounds like its trying to be a Ad serving software for microsoft

    come on, we need to stop microsoft and later big tech

    Notice

    THIS COMMENT WAS NOT MADE OR ASSISTED BY ANY FORM OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN ANY WAY, SHAPE, OR FORM

  • xxce2AAb@feddit.dk
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    53
    arrow-down
    2
    ·
    7 hours ago

    …lives entirely inside… It requires no X, no Y and no Z. …sits between…

    Is it really too much to ask that “journalists” write their own copy rather than have an LLM do it for them? It’s aggravating to read.

  • Kairos@lemmy.today
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    19
    arrow-down
    1
    ·
    7 hours ago

    The TPM architecture has always been fundamentally bad. More or less, these systems work by querying the TPM for the password and then pasting it into the password field. The way Linux does it is fundamentally flawed.

    Edit: oh it’s just a window that lets you do stuff without logging in. I forgot Microsoft is that stupid now.

  • frongt@lemmy.zip
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    12
    arrow-down
    1
    ·
    6 hours ago

    Reminds me of the classic exploit of going to the help on the login page of Windows 98 or 2000 and from there launching anything you want. What is old is new again, I guess.

    I’m not sure why the article talks about bitlocker, though, it’s not related to this in any way.

    • yucandu@lemmy.world
      link
      fedilink
      English
      arrow-up
      3
      ·
      4 hours ago

      I remember there was a script you could run from a bootable floppy that would give you the local admin password for Windows 2000, then I’d use that to patch the Windows 2000 PCs in my high school lab so that it gave a fake ctrl-alt-del login, and keylogged all login entries to a local file. One day the teacher logged in, and I had his network admin. From there we got all the answers to the exams for the rest of the year. The class average was 97, and they gave us awards in the auditorium stage at the end of the year.

    • folekaule@lemmy.world
      link
      fedilink
      English
      arrow-up
      6
      ·
      6 hours ago

      It’s related in the sense that the drive was unlocked at boot and stays unlocked when the screen is locked. This allows then to copy files off the drive from the lock screen, whereas ideally the lock screen would be completely isolated and not able to access the user’s files.

      I suspect it will be very difficult to actually fix that part, because you can get notifications and such on the lock screen, needing access to said files.

      • frongt@lemmy.zip
        link
        fedilink
        English
        arrow-up
        5
        ·
        6 hours ago

        The lock screen is not really a security boundary. It’s a convenience at best. Once a system is booted into windows, it’s running all kinds of services that are exploitable over the network, too. And if you can log on as another user, you can exploit local services.

        If you want to protect a system, enable full disk encryption with a strong password and shut it down. (Assuming there aren’t other vulnerabilities in bitlocker, again.)

        • folekaule@lemmy.world
          link
          fedilink
          English
          arrow-up
          2
          ·
          5 hours ago

          I was just pointing out what relevance Bitlocker (a disk encryption system) had to do with anything. It’s mentioned in the article.

          I’m not a security expert, but I presume that when that level is security is required, it would be possible to build such a system that does do a complete lockdown when the screen is locked. That wasn’t the subject of my comment, though.

        • orbituary@lemmy.dbzer0.com
          link
          fedilink
          English
          arrow-up
          1
          arrow-down
          1
          ·
          5 hours ago

          This is like saying “if you want to have safe sex, put a condom on and never have sex.”

          Devices should have ACLs in place at the file system level, be encrypted without proper credentials, and deny access from unspecified locations.

          Deny all and allow only what’s specified.