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Cake day: March 30th, 2026

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  • Ok, I am sorry for the ad hominem shenanigans from my side. I was frustrated because your post wasn’t specific, not even with one example, and without specifics (a quote, a ref) I end up piling up benefit of the doubt and we talk past each other. So here are mine.

    No, I did not mean Dual EC. You’re right that it’s a completely different thing in form and execution. I meant Snowden’s own definition, from his tweets of 28 Oct 2015. He was answering UK minister Joanna Shields, who had said it’s “not about creating back doors” but about companies giving access “when presented with a warrant”. Snowden replied:

    “A backdoor is a mechanism to provide secret access to otherwise confidential communications. It has nothing to do with warrants.” “The warrant is immaterial. A backdoor that requires a warrant is still a backdoor.”

    a source URL : https://www.kitguru.net/gaming/security-software/jon-martindale/snowden-blasts-british-government-over-contradiction-on-encryption/

    That’s more about secret access to confidential stuff than about weakening crypto. So my point was never “the graph = Dual_EC”. It was: how close does the graph come to Snowden’s interpretation? Frankly: not all the way. Nobody has shown a third party actually querying it, so by his definition it’s not a backdoor. At most it’s the room behind the door, already prepared and even made resilient.

    Regarding these points I agree with you:

    • Sleep/reachability/etc. tagging from timestamps is trivial. Your journalctl example is perfect.
    • A lot of it is the advertised product (search “Duane”, Focus/Sleep).
    • The “applies to any personalized assistant” line is buried. Though I’d read it as a bigger problem, not a smaller one: it’s a class issue, not an Apple issue. It’s also maybe, at least my fear, where the privacy increasing momentum peaking with GDPR is being asphyxiated. People become even more transparent using AI and that data became even more valuable. Now maybe my tinfoil hat take: Look at India using their insane numbers as an experimental platform for rent to several big techs in a (parallel/‘kind of similar’ methods) competition i. e. with CCP. The problem is not enough data for training, right, so the forces against privacy increase tenfold, similar to AI intelligence increase accelerating in a way, the labs actually hide as much as possible (see Anthropic IPO redactions). Tinfoil hat off.

    Where I don’t:

    1. Outside encryption. Messages are E2EE in transit, but the graph is the already analysed result, sitting in plaintext SQLite (“stored in plaintext but located in a zone protected by TCC Full Disk Access”, states the blog article). Whoever gets into the unlocked device (malware, physical access, forensic tools, the article names iLEAPP) gets a ready-made profile instead of raw data.

    2. Your logs comparison actually shows the difference. On my Linux I can read journalctl, rotate it, vacuum it. Here the article says Apple provides “no general way to correct an inference that is wrong”, and when you delete a contact the row moves to a second table, expired_stable_graph, “and keeps its confidence and its sources. Like wtf: “Dear customer, you want to delete some meta data? No problem, we make a copy first and then delete it, but lets forget about the copy. Have a beautiful day, nothing to see here…”. How long it stays there is not clear”. So even if I, hypothetically the owner, wanted to respect someone else’s privacy, I can’t really and but even if I thought I did I get gaslighted. That’s hopefully AND hopefully not “the OS working as advertised”. Maybe it depends on who one is leaning team FBI’ish or more towards grandma~average citizen.

    3. Non-users. People who never bought Apple (like me alledgetly) get relationship labels, contact patterns and face clusters on every Apple device of everyone they ‘talk’. This is so infuriating. Your dmesg doesn’t do that by default to your contacts.

    And to the thread question (is there evidence of backdoors on iOS): the closest documented cases are Zdziarski 2014 (undocumented services like file_relay that bypassed backup encryption, Apple admitted they exist but called them diagnostics) and Operation Triangulation 2023 (undocumented hardware feature used to bypass kernel memory protection, CVE-2023-38606, intent unknown). Neither proves a deliberate door for a third party. Same for the graph: undocumented and intentional, yes. Access by someone other than the owner, not shown.

    So maybe we agree it’s not clickbait-level “Apple backdoor!”, but not just downplayed “wtf logs exist? /s” either.





  • The tech and the goal of the tech is of increasing importance IMHO. It is cheap. It seems to work as intended. I hope it gets more widespread adoption and growth as I notice big tech has become even more violently invasive using the AI usage data of their customers.

    But if the client device/phone is not secure enough against invasive taking into possession of everything you do like Apple/Alphabet/Huawei etc. backdoored OSs then I would start with that. GrapheneOS for example.


  • I don’t know but I would use a keep alive property such that the data can be tossed when for example: – the true person makes 2-3 additional data points with an “alert” time t_alert to deprecate all potential nodes with t > t_alert. Potentially affected transaction/interaction partners need be warned/informed (or not, if suspected culprit). – all potential nodes “die” after a delay of x hours after the last generated data.

    Now my critique: palm scan can be 3D printed accurately. IMHO the only viable scan in terms of trust/confidence is from the eye as video with a bunch of samples watching some kind of a moving dot on the phone or whatever. The lens need be good enough and the min amount of samples need to be in relation to potential image quality right? Potato camera infinite…